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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Unlike much of previous literature on determinants of human rights performance between 
the countries, we conduct an econometric analysis of socioeconomic, institutional and 
political factors determining government respect for human rights within India. Using 
time series cross-sectional data for 28 Indian states for the period 1993 – 2002, we find 
that internal threat poised by number of social violence events, presence of civil war and 
riot hit disturbed areas are strongly associated with human rights abuses. Amongst 
socioeconomic factors, „exclusive‟ economic growth, „uneven‟ development, poor social 
development spending, youth bulges and differential growth rates between minority 
religious groups explain the likelihood of human rights violations. Capturing power at the 
state and central level by Hindu national parties‟ viz., Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 
Shiv Sena, further help understand the incidence of human rights violations within India. 
These results brings important recognition to the fact that human rights abuses are not 
evenly spread within a country rather than viewing each country as homogenous.  
Moreover, it also has numerous advantages in seeking the determinants of the causes of 
such abuses as many more variables are held constant within a single country than in 
previous studies.  
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“It is not the so-called Naxalities who have fathered their violence but those who have 
persistently defied and defeated the laws for the past so many years - be they politicians, 
administrators, landlords, or moneylenders. When such happens to be the situation and 
when the institutions and process of democracy are found to be so woefully lacking, is 
there any wonder that discontent, frustration, anger, and what should turn the minds of 
some towards violence as the only possible saviour?” 
- Jayaprakash Narayan  
Face to Face (1970)  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several competing theories have formulated to explain the cross-national variations in 
factors influencing government respect for human rights
1
. Prominent studies like: 
McKinlay & Cohan (1975 & 1976); Strouse & Claude (1976); Ziegenhagen (1986); Park 
(1987); Boswell & Dixon (1990); Henderson (1991); Cingranelli (1992); Henderson 
(1993); Poe & Tate (1994); Davenport (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997); Fein (1995); Blasi & 
Cingranelli (1996); Meyer (1996); Cingranelli (1996); King (1997); Richard (1997); 
Cingranelli & Richards (1997); Poe, Tate & Keith (1999);  Davenport & Armstrong 
(2004); Carey & Poe (2004) and Landman (2005) have focused on explaining various 
key determinants of human rights performance across the countries. They have all jolted 
down certain conditions which induce government towards repression. We classify them 
into three major categories namely, socioeconomic factors, institutional factors and 
political factors. The findings in the literature shows any improvement in socioeconomic 
conditions often result in better human rights performance, while institutional factors like 
conflicts (Dreher, Gassebner & Siemers, 2007) and political competition (Beer & 
Mitchell, 2006; Richards & Gelleny, 2007 and Cingranelli & Filippov, 2008) lead to the 
opposite. Taking these factors into consideration, the task of this study is to determine if 
causal relationship exists between these factors, acting as independent variables and 
human rights abuses.  
 
All the studies mentioned above, examine the determinants of human rights abuses across 
the countries. Often national aggregates may not capture the local factor dynamics very 
well and such local factors may be well argued to cause higher or lower human rights 
abuses. This is exactly the case of India which is rated high on democracy scale but its 
performance is very poor on human rights front. The cross national analysis of Davenport 
& Armstrong (2004) suggests that a polity score anything of eight or above eight should 
lead to good human rights performance. In the case of India, the polity score is 9 and 
                                                 
1
 The concept of Human Rights abuses has always been problematic to define. However, we would like to 
take into account all those aspects, which in some or the other ways are related to abuses of human rights. 
Generally human rights considers “integrity of people” which include: torture, extrajudicial killing, 
political imprisonment, and disappearances, and “empowerment rights of people”, which are political & 
civil rights of people and workers. 
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human rights performance measured by Political Terror Scale
2
 (PTS hereafter) is 4 and 0 
according to CIRI data of human rights on Physical Integrity Rights index
3
 (PIR 
hereafter). Therefore, this study highlights the need to go below the national level to see 
if the regional dynamics and local factors influence the variation in human rights 
performance. Also, India is an ideal case to test for this relationship simply because of its 
vast diverse nature of economic, social, cultural and demographic factors within the 
regions, institutional design which is majoritarian yet ethnically very diverse and divisive 
regional political structure. This apart, huge regional variance in human rights violation 
events, social violence events and also ready availability of the data makes India as an 
attractive region for this study. To the best of our knowledge this is first such attempt 
after Beer & Mitchell (2006) to test this relationship using subnational factors.  
 
Our goal is to build an original and parsimonious model for the states within India taking 
into account the standard models used for national level in the literature. Our idea is to 
see whether these national level factors could be revalidated and replicated along with 
certain key local and regional dynamics to make further inroads into the study of 
determinants of human rights abuses at subnational level. We do so using the dataset that 
spans for the period 1993 – 2002 for 28 Indian states. Using pooled cross-sectional time 
series analysis we begin by reexamining the hypotheses originally tested for national 
level in literature by setting up an appropriate model which then adds various important 
regional factors relevant in the context of Indian states to guide our analysis on 
subnational study. This perhaps recognizes the fact that human rights abuses are not 
evenly spread within a country rather than viewing each country as homogenous.  
Moreover, it also has numerous advantages in seeking the determinants of the causes of 
such abuses as many more variables are held constant within a single country than in 
previous studies.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we position our analysis in 
the Indian subnational context by postulating various socioeconomic, political and 
institutional factors acting as major determinants of human rights abuses. The section 3 
designs the empirical models for human rights abuses within Indian context. In section 4, 
we begin with bivariate analysis and discuss the empirical results, and sections 5 
conclude the study and highlight the scope for further research on Indian subnational 
context. 
 
2. Socioeconomic, Institutional & Political Determinants 
 
Previous research on violations of human rights has established that there are several key 
factors that explain why governments violate human rights (McKinlay & Cohan, 1975; 
Strouse & Claude, 1976; Park, 1987; Cingranelli, 1992; Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 
1995, 1996, 1997; King, 1998; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Carey & Poe, 2004 and 
                                                 
2
 Based on a codification of country information from Amnesty International‟s & US state department 
annual human rights reports PTS is scaled from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) human rights respect. 
3
 PIR is an additive index constructed from observations on torture, extrajudicial killing, political 
imprisonment, and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no government respect for these four human 
rights to 8, full government respect for these four human rights. 
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Landman, 2005). Based on the literature and taking into account the important regional 
factors in India, we divide these determinants into three major heads namely, 
institutional, socioeconomic and political factors.  
 
a. Institutional Factors: 
 
The first and the foremost reason why the governments are engaged in process of 
repression is due to threats. Sometimes these threats can be either real or simply 
preconceived by the government. Thus, whenever the governments are faced with such 
threats, they resort to the means of repression (Stohl, 1975; Rasler, 1976; Tilly, 1978; 
Lopez, 1986; Gurr, 1986; Mason & Krane, 1989; King, 1999; Muller & Weede, 1990; 
Gartner & Regan, 1996; Franklin, 1997; Loveman & Davies 1997; Poe, Tate & Keith, 
1999; Mahoney-Norris, 2000; Poe, Tate & Lanier, 2000; Lee, 2001; and Kaufman, 2001). 
Threats can be of several types like civil war, ethnic war or even international conflicts, 
in the federal context, sometimes it can also be conflicts between the states and 
provinces. To control the state disorder, government represses the human rights (Mitchell 
& McCormick, 1988; Blanton, 1999; Apodaca, 2001 and Blanton & Blanton, 2004). 
Thus, we believe that the government respect towards human rights is lower when the 
governments are faced with threats in the form of conflicts. Thus, we formulate three 
propositions: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Presence of civil war leads to increase in human rights abuses. 
 
To capture the civil war presence in the state, we include the dummy variable 1 if there 
exists civil war in that particular state and 0 otherwise. The data comes from the 
calculations based on the information available from Uppsala database updated version of 
2007.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Increase in number of social violence events is associated with lower 
government respect for human rights. 
 
The data for number of social violence events is event count for each state in each year 
adapted from India subnational problem set codebook, 1960-2005 developed by 
Marshall, Sardesi, and Marshall (2005) for the project „State Failure Task Force‟, Center 
for Systemic Peace.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher the number of disturbed areas, greater the state repression. 
 
The disturbed area in the state is where the riots have taken place. We code the dummy 
variable 1 if there were riots in that particular state in that year and 0 otherwise. The data 
comes from the study of Beer and Mitchell (2006).  
The relationship between ethnic composition and violations of human rights is not very 
clear. Many works in the literature shows that ethnic composition has a significant impact 
on internal conflicts (Hibbs, 1973; Muller & Seligson 1987; Lindström, 1996; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 1998; Ellingsen, 2000; Sambanis, 2001 and García & Marta, 2002). While 
others could not find any significant affect (Henderson, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
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There are also other studies who have taken more cautious stand. The study of Hegre & 
Sambanis (2006) finds that ethnic fractionalization could be a root cause only in low-
intensity armed conflicts. Similarly, Besancon (2005) argues that the societies which 
experience higher levels of inequalities, lower levels of socioeconomic and human 
development are more prone to ethnic conflicts. Moreover, many scholars have 
empirically shown that ethnic civil wars are different from non-ethnic civil wars, and that 
the former last longer and are more violent. The two most prominent studies on this topic 
developed by Lee et al. (2002) and Walker & Poe (2002) focus on the effects of ethnic 
diversity on multiplicity of human rights abuses. They find limited support for the 
proposition that ethnic composition reduces the government respect for human rights. 
India is a classic case to study the impact of ethnic composition on conflicts. With over 
28 states, 29 languages spoken by more than a million native speakers and nine major 
religions being practiced, it would be imperative to study impact of changes in ethnic 
composition giving rise to societal conflicts and thereby may lead to human rights abuses.   
 
Hypothesis 4: Higher the religious and linguistic fractionalization, greater the risk 
of political violence, thereby human rights abuses. 
 
For this purpose, we develop a single indicator viz., religious and lingual fractionalization 
index which is average values of degree of language and religious fractionalization 
adapted from the study of Urdal (2008). There are vast number of studies in literature 
which have highlighted the importance of change in growth and composition of ethnic 
groups. This argument is popularly known as differential growth hypothesis. More 
specifically, advocates of this theory argue that when different ethnic groups grow with 
different pace this could lead to political instability risking societal violent conflict 
(Horowitz, 2001; Lake & Rotchild, 2001; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001 and Urdal, 2008). 
Testing this argument empirically Toft (2007) finds for global sample that indeed 
differential growth in ethnic groups along with decline in the growth in majority groups 
leads to risk of violence. This apart, she also finds that closer the gap between the sizes of 
two largest ethnic groups in the country, higher the chances of violent conflict.  
 
These arguments hold good for India because of substantial variation in growth of 
different ethnic groups in different states. Though Hindus make 80.5% of the population, 
the share of Muslims increased significantly from 6% in 1981 to 13.43% in 2001 (Census 
2001).  While the rate of growth of population of Hindu majority declined substantially 
from 25% in 1991 to 20% in 2001, the growth rate of Muslim population if not increased, 
it remained almost at same levels of around 30% (Census 2001). The annual growth of 
Muslim population in India between 1961 and 2001 has been 2.74%. This figure by all 
international standards is quite high. Justino (2004) empirically found that lower volume 
of riots in India is associated with larger majority of Hindus in total population in each 
state. This suggests that religiously diverse states are more likely to experience episodes 
of civil unrest. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Increase in non-hindu majority population in states is more likely to 
experience communal violence, there by human rights abuses.  
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The non-hindu majority population share to total population is a dummy variable coded 
“1” if non-hindu population is the majority in that particular state and “0” otherwise. The 
data for thus variable is adapted from Urdal (2008). 
 
Hypothesis 6: Increase in the share of Muslim population relative to the total 
population in a state, greater the risk of conflicts leading to human rights abuses.  
 
In the case of India, religious and caste diversities are most likely to be correlated with 
socioeconomic inequalities (Harriss-White, 2002; Justino, 2004). This often runs the risk 
of social violence.  Violence against minorities in India is often regularized in the name 
of communal and national security (Kumar, 2005). Chadda (2006) opine that denial of 
democratic and political participation rights led to failure to integrate the minority groups 
into the main stream society is actually risking human rights violations by the 
government in India.  
 
Hypothesis 7: The risk of societal conflict is higher with the increase in share of 
Schedule Caste/ Schedule Tribe population relative to the total population in a state 
leading to human rights abuses. 
 
The percentage share of Muslim and SC/ST population to total population is calculated 
from the data set of Census 1991 and 2001 published by Central Statistical Organization 
(CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation Government of India. 
  
b. Socioeconomic Factors: 
 
Economic conditions play a significant role in determining the government‟s respect for 
human rights. But the relationship between economic development and human rights is 
not clear. According to the modernization theory, economic development leads to higher 
respect for human rights as development process tends to reduce threats and the 
likelihood of state repression is less (Lipset, 1959 & 1994). On the other hand, 
dependency theory claims that economic development would hamper respect for human 
rights (Chase-Dunn, 1989). This is because if the goods in the society are unevenly 
distributed creating economic unrest leading to outbreak of violence. However, 
prominent studies in the literature show that indeed economic development often leads to 
government respect for human rights (Zimmermann, 1980; Mitchell & McCormick, 
1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Davenport 1995; Blanton, 1999; Frey et al., 1999; Milner, 
2002; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; Blanton & Blanton, 2004 and Eriksen & de 
Soysa, 2008). The relationship between economic development and state repression 
surely deserves to be tested in the case of Indian states. This is because previous research 
studies (Gupta, 1999) argue that there is uneven progress and development within India. 
There is a higher level of economic development in industrial states including some of 
the Western and Southern states, while many of the North-Eastern states are isolated from 
the success story of development. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Higher the levels of economic development in states, lower the state 
repression. 
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In the case of economic development atleast there are large numbers of prominent studies 
which show positive association with human rights. But this is not the case with 
economic growth. The research community is evenly divided on this topic. Some expect 
that economic growth would increase state repression because it leads to instability as the 
rebellion increases (Olson, 1963; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999 and Blanton & Blanton, 2004).  
The rebellion initiates because of the disproportionate wealth being generated out of rapid 
economic growth by the rich and elites. Thus, by repression the state would stop the large 
section of the society to demand for their pie in the share of the wealth generated (Brown, 
1988). There is also interesting evidence which shows that economies grow fastest when 
basic human rights are respected (Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004 and Kaufmann, Kraay & 
Mastruzzi 2004). While, others show that growth would increase economic activity 
leading towards socio-economic and human development. This reduces the scope for 
instability and increases the respect for human rights (Mitchell & McCormick, 1988 and 
Marks & Diamond, 1992). Apart from these, there are also studies who could not find 
any relationship between the two (Zimmermann, 1980 and Weitz, 1986).  
 
We try to gather some evidence about the direction of the relationship in the case of 
Indian states. This becomes even more interesting due to three reasons. One, the states in 
India experience uneven economic growth rates. Most of the industrial states tend to 
outperform the rest interms of economic growth. Two, the states experience volatility in 
economic growth. This is due to several factors like poor monsoon, drought and 
slowdown in industrial growth. Lastly, economic growth in most of the Indian states 
looks exclusive. This means the benefits of the growth is being enjoyed by only a section 
of the society. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Higher levels of economic growth rates are often associated with 
human rights abuses. 
 
We control the effects of development and growth by introducing logged value of per 
capita GDP in INR constant terms and GDP growth rate respectively. The data is drawn 
from Reserve Bank of India‟s economic database.   
 
There is a vast amount of literature which shows that population is directly related to 
human rights (Goldstone 1991; Henderson, 1993; Homer-Dixon et al. 1993; Poe, Tate, 
1994; Howard & Homer-Dixon 1995; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Blanton, 1999; Blanton 
& Blanton, 2004 and Eriksen & de Soysa 2008). There are also other studies which have 
used various other indicators as proxies for human rights like civil and political liberties 
and socioeconomic rights indicating negative linkage with population pressures (Frey & 
Al-Mansour 1995; Moon 1991 and Williamson 1987). We predict that states with large 
size of population often witness violation of human rights respect. This is because large 
levels of population place the pressure on the state‟s scare natural resources and on 
governments to deliver the public services (Vadlamannati, 2008). This can lead to 
rebellion amongst people and when repressed, it tends to look large due to its size of 
population. 
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The rate of growth of population is also a key determinant of government‟s respect 
towards human rights. It is well argued that population levels lead to resource crunch 
(Henderson 1993; Poe, Tate, 1994 and Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). Added to this, a higher 
rate of growth of population would exert more competitive pressure on resources. This 
pressure caused by higher growth rate of population might result in rebellion against the 
state, allowing state to use repressive measures.    
 
Hypothesis 10: Human rights abuses will increase when population levels are large. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Human rights abuses will increase when growth rate of population is 
higher. 
 
Along with population pressure, youth bulges (the population between the age group of 
12 – 25 years) have also been argued to potentially increase the opportunity of civil war 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Urdal, 2005; 2006 & 2008). In the first attempt of such 
studies, Goldstone (1991 & 2001) argues that youth bulge has been associated with 
political crisis. Large youth populated countries are likely to witness violence if they face 
the problems related to unemployment, expansions in higher education with limited 
employment opportunities, lack of political openness, and crowding in urban centers 
(Moller, 1968; Choucri, 1974; Braungart, 1984; Goldstone, 1991; 2001; Cincotta et al., 
2003). Supporting the view are the studies of Hudson & den Boer (2004) Urdal (2008) 
have found that large surplus of youth population particularly in the case of India lead to 
considerable security risk. This security risk often ends up with rebellion against the 
state, forcing the state to use repression.    
 
Hypothesis 12: ‘Youth bulges’ are associated with higher human rights violations. 
 
We take into account the log value of total population and youth population falling under 
the age group of 14 – 25 of each state and calculate from those values the rate of growth 
of population. The data for population comes from Economic Survey 2007, Ministry of 
Finance, Government of India.  
 
Ideally speaking, poor socioeconomic conditions in the form of income inequality which 
is the difference between „haves and have nots‟ and poverty levels, people living below 1 
US$ per day pose serious problems for the governments. The larger the percentage of 
people living below poverty line and higher income inequality create social discord 
leading to political instability and risk of societal conflict between „haves and have nots‟ 
in the society. In the process if situation goes out of control, government resorts to 
repressive measures
4
. Gurr (1985, 1986) argue that the benefits of economic growth are 
enjoyed by few sections of the society, the elites and rich. Refusing to share the wealth 
                                                 
4
 Perhaps the best suited example for this in Indian states context is the incident occurred in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh‟s capital city Hyderabad in 2000 when the Communist Party led activities were organizing 
the protests against the ruling TDP (Telugu Desam Party) government‟s neoliberal polices. When the police 
failed to stop the protestors, government resorted to firing. In the process total 6 protestors are reports to 
have killed, leaving several injured and protest was suppressed.  
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evenly with the „have nots‟, often leads to rift in the society. Thus, the elites and rich 
influence the government to repress the protests carried out by the poor.  
 
There is a vast amount of literature which has shown that inequality and persistent 
poverty levels in the society are responsible for the outbreak of riots, civil wars and 
insurrections. Popular among such studies include Olson (1963); Sigelman & Simpson 
(1977); Hardy (1979); Weede (1981, 1987); Muller (1985); Park (1986); Muller & 
Seligson (1987); Midlarsky (1988); Londregan & Poole (1990); Boswell & Dixon 
(1990); Brockett (1992); Perotti (1992); Svensson (1993); Binswanger, Deininger & 
Feder (1993); Alesina & Rodrik (1994);  Keefer & Knack (1995); Alesina & Perotti 
(1996); Alesina et al. (1996); Perotti (1996); Schock (1996); Piketty (1997) and Mansoob 
& Gates (2005) all of them show that inequalities of various forms are generally found to 
be associated with political instability leading to conflicts. Latest in the block includes the 
study of Boix (2004) which reveal that income inequalities are one of the strong 
determinants of different forms of conflicts ranging from simple protests, revolutions, 
and riots to civil war extending even to guerrilla wars
5
. Similarly, Do & Iyer (2007) finds 
that conflict intensity is significantly higher in places with greater poverty in the 
provinces of Nepal. Blomberg, Hess & Thacker (2006) and Murshed (2007) opine the 
higher levels of poverty are detrimental to development leading to conflicts. In a recent 
conceptual note by Justino (2008) argues that poverty affects the onset and duration of 
violent conflict. 
 
But, there are also studies which find no relationship between inequality and repression 
(Muller, 1985). The study by Duff and McCamant (1976) also show no existence of any 
kind of relationship between the two. Even research findings related to this topic in 
Indian context is divided. The studies by Sergenti (2005) and Kumar, Haridwar & Kant 
(2005) find that inequality and poverty are strongly associated with riots and conflicts. 
The study by Justino (2004) could not find any statistically significant relationship 
between income inequality and the volume of rioting within India. Given the 
contradictory nature of the results in the literature and higher levels of poverty and 
inequality in majority of the Indian states, we feel logical to test the relationship between 
the two and human rights abuses.  
 
Hypothesis 13: Higher levels of Urban and Rural Poverty rates are associated with 
Human rights abuses. 
 
Hypothesis 14: Larger the difference between Rural and Urban Poverty rates, 
greater the risk of societal conflicts leading to human rights abuses. 
 
The time series data for combined poverty levels was difficult to obtain for all the states. 
Therefore, we obtained the data separately for rural and urban poverty levels the dataset 
developed by STICERD, EOPP group, LSE. The differential poverty rate is the 
subtraction of rural from urban poverty rates.  
 
                                                 
5
 One the principle slogan of Naxalites and Maoists in India is that their guerrilla warfare is the resultant of 
governments‟ failure to reduce inequality and poverty.  
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Hypothesis 15: Greater the inequality levels in the states, more likely the 
government to use repressive tactics.   
  
The data for inequality was difficult to obtain. First the dataset developed by EOPP of 
LSE was considered. But the data for the states ended at 1994. Also only 16 states were 
covered by EOPP. Therefore, we considered the dataset of pay inequality developed by 
the team of Prof. James Galbraith, University of Texas: Inequality project. The regional 
inequality data set for India was constructed for 28 states using emolument and 
employment statistics of the manufacturing sector of 25 sub-sectors. 
 
Theoretically speaking, if a state meets the condition of high income and high growth, it 
leads to increase in employment opportunities with reasonably high levels of salaries. 
This prosperous development climate yields dividends in the form of civil peace. 
Following the method of Ali & Galbraith (2005) and Vadlamannati (2007), we include an 
interaction effect between GDP growth and the level of income (percapita GDP). But if 
the growth and development process happens to be „exclusive‟, this could risk societal 
conflict. Similarly, if the condition of high income and high growth is met then inequality 
and poverty levels should eventually fall because people secure job opportunities with 
higher levels of salaries which improve their socioeconomic conditions and lower the risk 
of conflict. However, if the condition of high income and high growth becomes 
„exclusive‟ then the benefits are enjoyed only by certain sections of the community 
leading to the risk of conflict. To capture this effect, we include interactive measure of 
three variables viz., GDP growth, level of percapita GDP and income inequality. 
Similarly such interaction measure is introduced with urban and rural poverty rates.  
 
Hypothesis 16:  Meeting the condition of high income and high growth would reduce 
the risk of societal conflict leading to government respect for human rights.  
 
The basic responsibility of any government for that matter is to provide basic public 
goods and services to the citizens of the state. The basic public services include providing 
education, healthcare facilities, drinking water, sanitation and food to name a few 
important items in the list. Van de Walle & Nead (1995) find that basic health and 
education services almost universally yield benefits for the poor. But failing to provide 
these services adequately means the failure of the government. This leads to economic 
and social dissatisfaction amongst the poor and middle class in the society. The end result 
of poor governance is increase in unemployment, inequality and poverty levels risking 
political stability in the country. The governments start feeling pressure and would resort 
to repression measures to keep the situation under control.   
 
With over 1.13 billion population
6
 and 21% of people living below poverty line and 
around 33% of income inequality
7
, India acts as a perfect example to measure the impact 
of socioeconomic needs of the poor on human rights abuses in states. There are vast 
number of studies which argue that in order to reduce poverty and inequality levels, the 
government needs to further increase its spending on social and rural sector development 
                                                 
6
 Figure drawn from Census 2001, estimates for 2008. See: http://www.censusindia.net/ 
7
 Data comes from World Development Indicators, World Bank 2006. 
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(Dev &  Mooij, 2002; Howes, Murgai & Wes, 2004 and Keefer & Khemani, 2004). 
Infact studies have found that every increase in public expenditure on social sector and 
anti-poverty programmes has a significant impact on reducing overall poverty levels in 
India. This effect is found more for rural poverty rates (Nayyar, 2005). Similarly, Datt, 
Kozel and Ravallion (2003) found that government response towards poor in the form of 
social sector spending is one of the main and key determinants of poverty reduction in 
India during the period 1960-1995. Interestingly Besley & Burgess (2002) find that the 
needs of vulnerable citizens are reflected in government policy in situations where 
vulnerable populations rely only on state action for their survival and the group has 
substantial power to swing the electoral outcome. Thus, it is clear from the previous 
research findings related to India that spending towards socioeconomic needs of the 
people would lead to betterment of the society. But the commitment of the governments 
in doing so is far from clear. In direct evidence, Justino (2004) show that conflict in India 
has been negatively affected by the level of expenditure on social services.  
 
Hypothesis 17: Greater the socioeconomic needs in the states, higher should be the 
government spending on social sector and lower human rights abuses.  
 
The social sector spending as percentage of State GDP is taken as proxy for government 
spending to cater to the needs of socioeconomic needs of the people. The data comes 
from Reserve Bank of India‟s state finances database. 
 
Human development is seen as a form of distribution of assets (Perotti 1996; 
Bourguignon 2002). An important study by Barro (2001) and Lee & Barro (2001) 
confirms the importance of higher schooling levels as the key determinant of economic 
growth, and these findings are confirmed by many other empirical studies. Fedderke & 
Luiz (2008) finds that human capital matters for growth through its quality dimension; 
for distributional conflict by raising political aspirations. Indeed the study conducted by 
World Bank (1991) shows that increase in human rights respect leads to improvement in 
education levels and more particularly of females. Higher education levels reflect the way 
in which the states invest in human capital. This leads to overall well being leading to 
civil peace in the society.  
 
In the case of subnational study of India, Pradhan & Abraham (2002) finds that human 
development position of the states in India is strongly determined by the human 
development policy pursued. The economic growth impact significantly depends upon 
the human development policy. It confirmed that the government allocation for education 
is critical for economic development. In an another study by Meghani (2003) show that 
strong human development, in the form of increased literacy, the pro-poor effect is 
strengthened. But there are very less number of studies which have probed the direct 
relationship between human development and conflicts within India, given the fact that 
conflicts increase human rights abuses. The notable study by Justino (2004) finds a 
significant negative impact of human development in the form of School enrollment 
associated with number of riots. However, Urdal (2008) and Sergenti (2005) could not 
find any significant impact of literacy rates on conflicts risk and riots respectively. To 
account for the possibility of violence eruption in the state is less likely with higher levels 
of educated population.  
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Hypothesis 18: Higher human development yields positive dividends for government 
respect for human rights.  
 
To account for human development, we include literacy rates prevailing in states. The 
literacy data, which measure the percent of literate adults in a state, come from 1991 and 
2001 Census of India at points of time. So, we consider the time variant series developed 
by Beer & Mitchell (2006) for all states and union territories from 1993 to 2004. 
 
c. Political Factors 
 
The effect of political institutions and competition on conflicts was first observed by 
Alesina et al. (1996) and Barro (2002). It is widely believed that instigating riots and 
conflicts by certain sections of political fraternity is a means to protect their political 
power. Bawn (1995) argues that where there is higher electoral competition it gives rise 
to higher levels of human rights violations through violence. This is true atleast in Indian 
case as we have seen the instances of the incumbent government exercising the control 
over their agents to instigate communal mob violence and riots. We have seen this 
happening in case of Gujarat in 2002 and Uttar Pradesh in 1992. There is a perception 
that communal violence and riots are largely associated with the presence of extreme 
right wing ideology political parties in power. In India, the rise of Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP hereafter) as Hindu national party since early 1990s is seen as extreme right wing 
ideology political party
8
. While historically the Indian National Congress (INC 
henceforth) which single handedly ruled India for almost over 40 years is widely seen as 
grand secular party of India. Historically, the Muslim, Christian religious minorities and 
other Hindu minorities are comfortable with INC led governments. On the other hand, the 
BJP is known for its „Hindu nationalistic ideology‟ is traditionally pro-upper caste and 
anti religious minority groups. The INC blames BJP for championing for socio-religious 
cultural values of the country's majority community by instigating communal riots and 
violence against minorities. At the same time, BJP also accuses INC of playing the card 
of minority politics highlighting the role of INC in inciting and participating in anti-Sikh 
riots that killed thousands in 1984. BJP also accuses INC for showing favoritism towards 
appeasing Muslim and Christian communities to consolidate the minority vote bank and 
deliberately fragmenting Hindu community.  
 
Over the years political populism overshadowed economic development, is the major root 
cause of deep rooted social crisis in Indian society. Practicing political populism to the 
core is the INC, which saw its seat share increase to all time high during the 1984 union 
elections which was held due to the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi. In 1989 however, for the second time in Indian political history, INC failed to 
                                                 
8
 The BJP was previously known as Jan Sangh and was formed in 1980 by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal 
Krishna Advani. It is an important member of „Sangh Parivar‟ (family of a unit). BJP in its ideology is anti 
western, socialism and Nehuvian Secularism and predominantly aims for building up of „Hindu Rashtra‟ 
(Empire of Hindus) dominated by upper castes. Over the years it has strongly developed negative attitude 
towards minorities, particularly towards Muslims and Christians. Even in the economic development 
aspect, the idea of development substantially differs from the rest of political fraternity. BJP believes in 
„Swadeshi‟ policy (economic independence and self reliant policy).  
 13 
get an absolute majority. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi gave a fresh lease of life to 
the INC as it fell just short of simple majority in 1991 union elections
9
. On the other 
hand, BJP which was formed in 1980 obtained just two seats in the union elections of 
1984 saw its tally increase to 64 seats in 1991 elections. But the BJP was largely 
restricted to North of India as its votes primarily came from in Northern and Western 
India as well as in Karnataka in the South. In Northern India, BJP captured power in 1991 
in the then largest state Uttar Pradesh
10
 by instigating communal violence. Lal Krishna 
Advani´s country wide „rath yatra‟ in 1991 for the construction of God Ram temple in 
Ayodhya in the place of Mosque led to massive outrage of communal violence which 
cause many victims. The destruction of Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu activities 
including BJP workers, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS hereafter) and other Hindu 
organization activists led to social insecurity amongst 140 million Muslim population 
only increasing communal tensions. This had spillover effects on other parts of India as 
many states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh 
witnessed heavy causalities in mob violence between Hindus and Muslims
11
.  
 
Equations of class-structure changes led to socio-political polarization as increase in 
middle class started predominantly supporting the BJP. After a brief two year political 
instability during 1996-97 saw BJP emerging as single largest party in 1998 union 
elections. Its vote share increased from 7.4% in 1984 to 25.60% in 1998. From just two 
seats in 1984, it obtained 182 seats in Lok Sabha elections in 1998. On the other hand, 
INC during the last 15 years (1984 – 1999) lost 15% of its vote share to the BJP12. With 
the help of its allies BJP formed National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government
13
 and 
ruled for six years. Many experts like Basu (2001) argue that the success of BJP came 
from provoking communal violence prior to gaining control in some of the biggest states. 
Wilkinson (2004) also believes that the communal card is played by BJP to gain and 
regain the power. The best example perhaps came from Godhra riots in Gujarat in 2002, 
which was largely done to retain the power by BJP. There were large numbers of 
Muslims deaths recorded during those riots, which is termed by the national and 
international media as one of the worst ever riots India has ever seen. The Human Rights 
Watch world report on India (2002) states in its report that: “Godhra massacre was 
immediately followed by a four-day retaliatory killing spree, in which over two thousand 
people, mostly Muslim, fell victim to mobs that looted and burned their homes, destroyed 
places of worship and Muslim-owned businesses, and gang-raped and sexually mutilated 
Muslim women and girls. In some cases, pregnant women's bellies were cut open and 
                                                 
9
 INC secured only 195 seats in 1989 union elections. This rose to 235 seats in 1991 elections. 
10
 At the moment the present largest state in India is Maharashtra as Utter Pradesh was bifurcated in 2000 
and Uttarakhand was formed.  
11
 Many see the Mumbai blasts by terror outfits in 1993 as a response to the demolition carried out by 
Hindu activities of Babri Mosque.   
12
 There are several reasons for the fall of INC. Most of it is attributed to the Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims and 
Upper Castes turning away from INC. While Muslims saw new support in the form of new regional parties 
like Samajwadi Party, RJD, JD (U), Upper cases, Dalits and Adivasis moved towards BJP. With the help of 
the social work put on by RSS, Dalits and Adivasis got closer to BJP.  
13
 The formulation of NDA was seen as a major step in building of the coalition governments in India. It is 
led by the BJP and had 13 other regional parties, who were historically anti-INC in their stand supported 
NDA at the time of its formation in 1998. Later on, as many as 26 small regional parties also joined NDA.  
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fetuses were pulled out before the women were killed. In addition to the children who 
were direct victims of the mobs, children were witnesses to horrifying violations and 
deaths of family members…………………………… much of the violence was planned 
well in advance of the Godhra attack and was carried out with state approval and 
orchestration. Gujarat is headed by the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party that also heads a 
coalition government at the center. State officials and the police were directly involved in 
the violence: In many cases, the police led the charge, using gunfire to kill Muslims who 
got in the mobs' way. The groups most directly responsible for this violence against 
Muslims included the VHP, Bajrang Dal and RSS, collectively forming the sangh parivar 
("family" of Hindu nationalist groups).”  
 
Also, ever since the BJP led NDA government was in power in center from 1998 – 2004, 
there were reports of large number of attacks on Muslims and Christians particularly in 
the states of Gujarat and Orissa. According to the Human Rights Watch (2001) the 
attacks on Christians and other minority groups increased significantly during the BJP led 
NDA rule. Since 1998, it claimed that there were over 500 forceful attacks. The Human 
Rights Watch (2000) reported that: “More incidents of violence against India's Christian 
community were recorded during the past two years than in all the years since 
independence. Attacks occurred primarily in the tribal regions of Gujarat, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Orissa, as well as the state of Maharashtra. Activists belonging to militant 
Hindu extremist groups, including the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(World Hindu Council, VHP) were often blamed for the violence. While the central 
government officially condemned the attacks, spokespersons for the BJP characterized 
the surge in violence as a reaction to a conversion campaign by Christian missionaries in 
the country.”  
 
The BJP is also credited with introducing one of the most repressive enactments during 
their tenure at center, POTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act) in 2002. Along with 
opposition parties like INC and several others, National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) and other NGOs criticized BJP for implementing POTA as an act of curtailing 
civil rights. According to NHRC, POTA gives the government and law enforcing 
agencies all-encompassing powers to arrest suspected persons as terrorists, seize 
communication and curtails free movements of suspects. Joe Saunders, Deputy Director 
of Asia at Human Rights Watch (2001) opines, “We're concerned that the proposed law 
could open the door to police abuse. One can understand renewed concern with 
terrorism in light of recent events, but the new provisions are a throwback to earlier laws 
that caused nothing but trouble. In its haste to act, India should not repeat past mistakes” 
 
Critics also argue that authorities at the helm often misused POTA powers for political 
purposes. However, things changed full circle as BJP lost power in 2004 union elections 
and the INC led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
14
 formed the government and 
repealed the POTA. Human Rights Watch (2004) expressed: “government’s repeal of the 
                                                 
14
 The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was formed by Indian National Congress party after the 2004 
union elections. Prior to the elections there existed an informal alliance, but came under one umbrella only 
after the election with a seat sharing agreement and most importantly with an common policy ideology 
named National Common Minimum Program. 
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controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was a major step forward for civil 
liberties in India. POTA empowered security forces to hold individuals for up to 180 days 
without filing charges, broadening the scope of the death penalty, dispensing with the 
presumption of innocence by placing the burden of proof on suspects, and admitting 
confessions into evidence despite the frequent use of torture. The law was often used 
against marginalized communities such as dalits, indigenous groups, Muslims, and the 
political opposition.” 
 
Thus, literature and historical evidence on political competition and violence shows that 
party ideologies would have a greater influence on government policy on state repression. 
Showing evidence of the same in Indian case is the study by Justino (2004) which 
included national level variable representing the result of national elections on number of 
riots. She finds that INC majority is negatively associated number of riots. To this extent, 
it can be said that electoral competition and the kind of party ideologies will increase 
human rights violations. Based on these discussions, we formulate the following 
propositions: 
 
Hypothesis 19: Increase BJP seat share in state legislative assemblies is associated 
with higher levels of human rights abuses, while it is vice-versa in the case of INC. 
 
Hypothesis 20: Presence of BJP led federal government increases human rights 
violations. 
 
Hypothesis 21: Presence of BJP led state legislative governments are associated with 
increasing human rights violations, while it is vice-versa in the case of INC 
capturing power at state. 
 
The data for seat shares
15
 was obtained from two different sources. For major 16 states, 
the data was taken from the political dataset for states developed by STICERD, EOPP 
group, LSE
16
. While for other 12 states, the data was adapted from Beer & Mitchell 
(2006). The dummy variable construction for BJP presence at center was done using the 
information of Elections Commission of India‟s data sources17. 
 
3. Research Design: ‘Modeling Human Rights Abuses within India’ 
 
In political science literature, human rights are measured by either physical integrity 
rights or empowerment rights developed by Cingranelli & Richards (1999) of CIRI or 
political terror scale of Gibney (2004). This apart, many have also used Civil and 
Political rights freedom developed by Freedom House. However, these datasets are only 
restricted to national level. Any Subnational level data for any country is absent. 
Therefore, we adopted the dataset constructed by Beer and Mitchell (2006) for 25 states 
and seven union territories. They followed the method of collecting the information about 
                                                 
15
 In some Northeastern states and Southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerela, the BJP seat share is nil 
because of absence of the party there. In such cases we put the value “0”.  
16
 Data can be accessed from: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/data/Indian_Data/default.asp 
17
 Data can be accessed from: http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp 
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human rights abuses for each state and union territories from U.S. State Department 
reports. In the reports of the State Department, there is Section 1 for each country which 
provides detailed information on extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, degrading 
treatment, arbitrary arrests, detention and exile, denial of fair trail by judiciary, use of 
excessive police and paramilitary forces to suppress any forms of protests and violation 
of Human rights Law. The U.S. State Department inturn depends on collecting this 
information for India for each year from Amnesty International reports, UN sources and 
NHRC
18
 reports in India. Using this measure, Beer & Mitchell (2006) have come up with 
“number of human rights violation events”. These are simply even count of number of 
times each state and union territory was mentioned in section 1 of the U.S. State 
Department reports of human rights abuses. We use pooled OLS regression analysis for 
all the models. Thus, the model for human rights violations can be specified in the 
following format: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1) 
 
 are the corresponding coefficients,  is the intercept and η is the error term, while i and 
t help distinguish the state and time period in the panel. This empirical analysis covers 
about 28 Indian states for the period 1993 to 2002. We use pooled time-series cross-
sectional (TCSC) to fixed effects method because some of the variables like c 
fractionalization indices, share of SC/ST and Muslim populations, seat shares of BJP and 
Congress and differences between urban and rural poverty are time invariant series. The 
data may also exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While these 
problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a 
more robust method for large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. 
However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing 
invalid statistical inferences. To deal with these problems, we estimated for all the 
models the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated 
standard errors are robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial 
correlation within the cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000). 
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 The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was established on 12th October, 1993 under the 
legislative mandate of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. The NHRC is formulated by the central 
government, while the commission chairman is appointed by President of India. It collects information 
related to human rights violations in the country and hears the complaints and investigates the incidents. It 
also has the power to intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation of human rights 
pending before a court with the approval of such court. 
Human Rights Violations it  = 1 + 2 Number of social Violence events it + 3 Civil War it + 4 
Disturbed areas it + 5 Economic Growth it + 6 log (Economic Development) it + 7 log(Population) it 
+ 8 Growth rate of Population it + 9 Youth Bulges it + 10 Religious & Linguistic Fractionalization it 
+ 11 Non Hindu Majority it + 12 % SC/ST Population share it + 13 % Muslim Population share it + 
14 Literacy Rate it + 15 Social Sector Spending/GDP it + 16 INC seat share it  + 17 BJP seat share it  
+ 18 BJP Presence at center it  + 19 Time Dummy it + η it 
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4. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistics & Bivariate Plots 
 
The sample of state-years that we examine in total make up of 280 observations. In 
Annexure 1, we present summary statistics for this sample for all the variables that we 
employ in the regression analysis. The mean value for number of human rights violation 
events is 5.12 per state-year with a large standard deviation of roughly 12.11. The sample 
largely also includes those states in which there were no observations related to human 
rights violation events and hence, the distribution of the human rights violation events is 
skewed strongly to the right. Regarding GDP growth rate we can find that the median 
growth rate is 9.77%.  Moreover, the variance in GDP growth rates is quite high, with a 
standard deviation of 6.76% and growth rates ranging from –7.92% to 38.16%. With 
respect to percapita GDP, the mean value is Rs. 10950.64 with a standard deviation of 
Rs. 5630.03.  
 
In Annexure 2, we present the cross-sectional variation of average number of human 
rights violation events by state.  We see that the state with the highest mean number of 
human rights violation events is Jammu and Kashmir with 56.4 and the state with the 
fewest is Goa with 0.1, while for the union territory, Andaman & Nicobar it is 0. Jammu 
& Kashmir is followed by Assam (13.4), Punjab (12.9), Tripura (9.7), Andhra Pradesh 
(7.8) and Manipur (7.3). The annexure 2 also presents ranking for states for both human 
rights violation events and GDP growth rates.  
 
The rankings show that usually states with higher average of human rights violation 
events are characterized by lower GDP growth rate. These include: Andaman & Nicobar 
Islands, Arunachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Goa, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim. There are 
also notable exceptions which saw both higher GDP growth rates and higher human 
rights violation events. Examples of such include: Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Karnataka 
and West Bengal. We see this relative relationship clearly with the year-by-year plots of 
GDP growth rate and number of human rights violation events presented in figure 1. We 
see that in mid-1990s human rights violation events increase as GDP growth rate fall. In 
figure 2 we calculate the rate of growth of human rights violation events and plot it on 
year-by-year graph along with GDP growth rate. We see again that in mid-1990s the 
growth rate of human rights abuses events increase significantly. During the same point 
of time, we also see the decline in average growth rate of GDP.   
 
In figure 3 we capture the relationship between human rights violation events and BJP 
seat share average values for the study period. We find that increase in human rights 
violation events is associated with increase in BJP seat share in the states. In figure 4 we 
also see the relationship between BJP seat share and rate of growth of human rights 
violation events. In the graph we find that increase in BJP seat share is associated with 
increase in growth rate of human rights violation events. 
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4. 2. Regression Estimates 
 
The results of multiple regression estimates in assessing the socioeconomic, political and 
institutional determinants on human rights abuses within India are presented in table 1 to 
2 (models 1 to 8). We control for the problem of Heteroskedasticity using White 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.  
 
Beginning with institutional variables, in model 1 (table 1) we find that presence of civil 
war in the states has 1% significant positive impact on basic human rights violations. The 
human rights violation events suggest that the series is event count, meaning, higher the 
value, worst human rights abuses and lower value represent government respect for 
human rights. These results remain consistent across the board. Similarly, we find that 
every single social violence event is associated with 1.28% increase in human rights 
violation events. In other words, holding at its mean value, increase in social violence 
events by its highest value (1.08) would deteriorate the government respect for human 
rights by 1.28%. The statistical significance of 1% remains constant across all the models 
(see model 1 to 4; table 1). We also find that increase in disturbed areas lead to more 
human rights abuses. For the presence of each disturbed area per year-state is associated 
with 2.49% increase in human rights violation events.  
 
Table 1: Human rights violation equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Human rights violation events: Appearance of States 
 
 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Constant 
0.32 
(10.83) 
1.48 
(10.82) 
5.32 
(10.72) 
-0.78 
(13.48) 
Civil War Presence 
5.14 * 
(1.10) 
5.00 * 
(1.09) 
4.52 * 
(1.13) 
5.12 * 
(1.14) 
Social Violence Events 
1.28 * 
(0.14) 
1.28 * 
(0.14) 
1.30 * 
(0.14) 
1.29 * 
(0.14) 
Disturbed Areas 
2.49 *** 
(1.35) 
2.56 ** 
(1.35) 
1.89 + 
(1.37) 
2.62 *** 
(1.73) 
Economic Growth 
0.12 *** 
(0.07) 
0.12 *** 
(0.07) 
0.12 *** 
(0.07) 
0.13 *** 
(0.07) 
Log (Economic Development) 
1.98 *** 
(1.13) 
1.94 *** 
(1.13) 
1.64 + 
(1.14) 
2.10 *** 
(1.32) 
Log (Total Population) 
-3.85 * 
(0.79) 
-3.88 * 
(0.78) 
-2.82 * 
(0.64) 
-3.92 * 
(0.82) 
 
Population Growth 
-1.26 * 
(0.38) 
-1.30 * 
(0.37) 
-1.02 * 
(0.38) 
-1.27 * 
(0.37) 
Log (Youth Population) 
3.39 * 
(0.75) 
3.37 * 
(0.74) 
2.21 * 
(0.61) 
3.44 * 
(0.80) 
Religious & Language Fractionalization 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
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Non-Hindu Majority 
11.07 * 
(2.11) 
11.15 * 
(2.10) 
11.33 * 
(2.06) 
11.25 * 
(2.35) 
% SC/ST Population Share 
-0.15 * 
(0.03) 
-0.14 * 
(0.04) 
-0.16 * 
(0.04) 
-0.15 * 
(0.05) 
% Muslim Population Share 
0.22 ** 
(0.08) 
0.22 ** 
(0.08) 
0.21 ** 
(0.09) 
0.22 ** 
(0.09) 
Literacy Rates 
-0.20 * 
(0.04) 
-0.20 * 
(0.04) 
-0.21 * 
(0.04) 
-0.20 * 
(0.04) 
Social Sector Spending/GDP 
0.16 ** 
(0.06) 
0.15 ** 
(0.07) 
0.12 *** 
(0.06) 
0.16 ** 
(0.06) 
Congress Seat Share at states 
-5.69 * 
(1.77) 
-5.61 * 
(1.75) ----- 
-5.64 * 
(1.87) 
BJP Seat Share at states 
3.34 ** 
(1.39) 
3.43 ** 
(1.39) 
 
----- 
3.39 ** 
(1.40) 
BJP government presence at Center 
3.20 ** 
(1.24) 
3.20 ** 
(1.24) 
3.34 * 
(1.26) 
3.17 ** 
(1.28) 
Poverty Difference (Urban – Rural) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02  
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) ----- 
Pay Inequality 
4.36 
(3.68) 
4.32 
(3.65) 
5.08 + 
(3.66) 
4.62 
(4.31) 
Rule of Law ----- 
-0.01 * 
(0.00) ----- ----- 
Congress government presence at states ----- ----- 
-1.55 ** 
(0.77) ----- 
BJP government presence at States ----- ----- 
0.80 
(0.69) 
 
----- 
Urban Poverty Rate ----- ----- ----- 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Rural Poverty Rate 
 
----- 
 
----- 
 
----- 
0.03 
(0.05) 
Time 
0.28 
(0.20) 
0.29 
(0.20) 
0.26 
(0.20) 
0.29 
(0.22) 
 
R-squared 0.836399 0.838778 0.833712 0.836426 
Adjusted R-squared 0.823766 0.825655 0.820871 0.823112 
S.E. of regression 5.083061 5.055740 5.124639 5.092478 
Log likelihood -841.6440 -839.5934 -843.9250 -841.6207 
F-statistic 66.20600 63.91792 64.92677 62.82238 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Number of States 28 28 28 28 
Total number of Observations 280 280 280 280 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Consistent with some of the prominent studies in literature like Olson (1963); Chase-
Dunn (1989); Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) and Blanton & Blanton (2004), Vadlamannati, 
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(2008), we find that economic growth and development process have significant positive 
impact on human rights abuses within the states in India. The positive impact of GDP 
growth rate and percapita GDP on human rights supports the view that growth and 
development would increase state repression because it leads to instability as the 
rebellion increases. For every 1% increase in GDP growth rate there is a corresponding 
0.12% increase in human rights violation events. In the case of economic development, 
for every Rs. 1000 increase in percapita income is leading to 1.98% increase in human 
rights abuses. Both these results are significant at 10% confidence level and are 
consistent across the models, meaning, there is a strong positive link between economic 
growth and development and the occurrence of human rights violations during our 
sample period. These results are important because our bivariate graphic plots have 
shown a clear relationship between growth and human rights violation events, but we do 
not observe this relationship in the cross-section. Instead, our results are driven by the 
strong association between growth and human rights within the sates over time. However, 
previous studies on Indian states like Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti (2004) and Sergenti 
(2005) in the frame work of conflicts show that economic growth lead to decline in riots. 
As we have argued earlier in section 2 that any effect on riots (increase/decrease) will 
have a direct effect on increase and/or decrease in government respect for human rights. 
However, the study by Sergenti (2005) also shows that economic development (percapita 
GDP) does not have any significant effect on riots. Moreover, the sign remains positive. 
All these results tell us that growth and development process within India is not inclusive. 
This is precisely one of the reasons why income inequalities in the states are still at 
higher levels. There is also wide range of disparity amongst the states in terms of 
development process. Though the economic reforms process have ushered higher levels 
of economic growth, its benefits are not reached to the poor in the form of higher 
development and improvement in standard of living. The study by Gupta (1999) supports 
the fact the growth and development process in India are exclusive and have helped only 
certain sections of the society. The annexure 2 shows the average GDP growth rates for 
the states during our study period. This shows that the states are witnessing economic 
growth which is important, but this seems to be not enough, as it is not translating into 
real gains interms of economic development, which is a proxy for standard of living. 
With this analysis one can argue that economic progress within Indian states is not 
inclusive. 
 
The most surprising results come from population pressures. Many studies like Hauge & 
Ellingsen (2001) and de Soysa (2002) Urdal (2005) have shown positive link between 
high population density and internal armed conflict in large cross-national time-series 
studies. However, we could not find that an increase in population levels exerts pressure 
on human rights abuses. On the contrary, we find a negative association of population 
levels and rate of growth of population on human rights violation events. The results are 
1% significant and are consistent across all the models. The only possible explanation for 
this could be that during the post reforms period (post 1991) there has been a slow down 
in the growth rate of population in India. This is also evident in some of the states which 
have witnessed reduction in population growth rates. Infact we find some support in the 
form of Urdal (2005) research study which shows that rapid population growth and 
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increased population density
19
 are not significant factors in the onset of conflict. The 
State Failure Task Force study by Esty et al. (1998), also find no empirical evidence on 
the relationship between population growth and density and different forms of state 
failure. But the interesting findings emerge when we introduce share of your population 
levels. We find a positive and 1% significant impact of youth population levels on human 
rights violation events within the Indian states. It is a known fact that developing 
countries have 1.3 billion of youth population (between the age group of 12 – 25 years). 
In the study conducted by Urdal (2005) argues that in those countries where youth 
population make up 35% of the total population, the risk of conflict increases by 150% 
compared to countries where youth population share make up only 17% of the 
population. India is a peculiar case of youth bulges as it has the highest stock of 
population between the age group of 14 – 30 years. Consistent with the findings of Esty 
et al. (1998) Urdal (2008) on Indian youth bulges and conflict risk, we find that for 1% 
increase in youth population share leads to 3.39% increase in human rights violation 
events. The results related to religious and linguistic fractionalization are insignificant 
throughout. Even the signs are mixed across the models (see tables 1 & 2).  
 
Again consistent with the findings of Urdal (2008) we find significant positive effect of 
non-Hindu majority populated states with human rights violation events. Increase in non-
Hindu population leads to tensed situations with the majority of the ethnic group often 
leading to breakdown of conflicts and riots.  For every single year-state increase in non-
hindu majority dummy is leading to 11.07% increase in human rights abuses events. This 
relationship is highly consistent in all the models. In line with these findings, we also find 
qualified support for positive effect of increase in percentage share of Muslim population 
to total population on human rights violation events. For the largest percentage share of 
Muslim population value (75%) would raise human rights violation events by 0.22%. But 
strangely, we find the results to be in opposite direction for SC/ST population share. This 
suggests that non-Hindu minority population increase is more prone to human rights 
abuses within India.  
 
Contrary to the findings of Justino (2004), we find that social sector spending/GDP help 
increase human rights violation events. He found that any increase in the same is 
associated with lower number of riots. However, for our study period we could not find 
the same. Essentially, social sector spending is considered to be the most powerful tool in 
the hands of the government to fight poverty. But previous research shows that many 
programs through this spending with an objective to reduce poverty have been dismal and 
expensive failures (Van de Walle, 1995). This is due to the fact that mere spending on 
social sector cannot result in improving the socioeconomic needs of the society. Rather, 
quality of spending matters. For example, state governments incur huge amount of 
expenditure on subsidies. But in reality the subsidies are not properly targeted as a result 
on one hand the poor is not able to reap the benefits of the subsidy granted and on the 
other hand, the amount spend on subsidies are wasted. However, the previous research on 
social sector spending in India shows that as the states increase their spending on social 
and rural development in the 1990s, the poverty levels also came down marginally (Vyas 
                                                 
19
 We also wanted to include Population density factors. Unfortunately, due to lack of appropriate data for 
all the states, we were forced to ignore this variable.  
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& Bhargava, 1996). Agreed that this was only marginal reduction, this highlights the 
potential of the government spending towards development. If the efficiency of 
government spending is improved by tackling problems like corruption, lack of 
accountability and inefficiency in management, this could make a significant contribution 
towards reduction in inequalities and poverty levels, thereby reducing economic and 
social insecurities. This would have a direct positive consequence on reducing the risk of 
conflicts and thereby greater respect for human rights. 
 
Amidst the findings of the studies related to Indian states on human development, riots 
and conflicts, our study finds 1% significant negative impact of human development on 
human rights violation events. The largest value of literacy rate (91.3%) would reduce 
human rights violation events by 0.20%. Human development in countries like India is 
very important because it has a potential of positive spillover effects not only in the form 
economic but social and societal development as a whole. Thus, higher rate of human 
development help reduce poor socioeconomic conditions and social unrest leading to 
civil peace and greater respect for human rights. Strangely, though poverty differential 
variable and pay inequality do tend to increase human rights violation events with their 
positive sign, but are not statistically significant. However in model 3 (table 1), we find 
that pay inequality increase human rights abuses. This result is in line with Boix (2004) 
and Justnio (2004) who find that inequality levels are often risk conflicts and riots and 
this is detrimental to human rights respect. This also means two things, one, it suggests 
that inequalities play an important role in instigating violence thereby human rights 
abuses and two, the result could be due to the presence of other types of inequality not 
captured by pay inequality data
20
. In model 4 (table 1) we decompose the poverty 
difference data into urban and rural poverty rates. Even here, though we could find 
positive sign, but the statistical significance is absent.  
 
The most interesting findings of the study are that of political factors. We find that any 
increase in seat share of INC within states is having a negative effect on human rights 
violation events (see table 1). This relationship is 1% significant and is robust throughout 
all the models in the study. Every 1% increase in INC seat share in state assemblies 
would lead to reduction in human rights violation events by almost 6%. On the contrary, 
for every 1% increase in BJP seat shares in state assemblies, human rights violation 
events would increase by 3.34%. Not just in states, we also find the mere presence of BJP 
led government at center is associated with human rights abuses within states. Each year 
presence of BJP led government at center would increase human rights violation events 
by 3.20%. Both these variables are 1% significant and are consistent across all the models 
(see models 1, 2 & 4; table 1). This proves our theoretical groundings that capturing 
power by extreme rights wing conservative ideological parties either at state assemblies 
or at center would reduce human rights performance.  
 
 
                                                 
20
 There is a substantial difference between the Gini and pay inequality data which is developed by the team 
of Prof. James Galbraith, University of Texas: Inequality Project using emolument and employment 
statistics of the manufacturing sector of 25 sub-sectors. While this reflects the inequality interms of wages 
and payments of laborers in industry, Gini measures household income inequalities.  
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Table 2: Human rights violation & interaction effects equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Human rights violation events: Appearance of States 
 
 
Variables 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
 
Constant 
17.87 
(4.87) 
18.56 * 
(5.01) 
20.56 * 
94.91) 
17.59 * 
(5.09) 
Civil War Presence 
5.13 * 
(1.10) 
5.09 * 
(1.11) 
4.80 * 
(1.08) 
5.19 * 
(1.00) 
Social Violence Events 
1.29 * 
(0.14) 
1.29 * 
(0.14) 
1.30 * 
(0.14) 
1.29 * 
(0.14) 
Disturbed Areas 
2.22 *** 
(1.37) 
2.44 *** 
(1.36) 
3.01 ** 
(1.34) 
2.29 *** 
(1.45) 
Economic Growth X Economic 
Development 
9.51E-06 ** 
(4.57E-06) 
----- ----- ----- 
Economic Growth X Economic 
Development X Urban Poverty 
----- 2.02E-07 *** 
(1.13E-07) 
----- ----- 
Economic Growth X Economic 
Development X Rural Poverty 
----- ----- 3.81E-07 * 
(1.32E-07) 
----- 
Economic Growth X Economic 
Development X Pay Inequality 
----- ----- ----- 2.44E-05 *** 
(1.57E-05) 
Log (Total Population) 
-3.94 * 
(0.75) 
-4.27 * 
(0.77) 
-4.55 * 
(0.79) 
-4.08 * 
(0.77) 
Population Growth 
-1.25 * 
(0.380 
-1.22 * 
(0.37) 
-1.21 * 
(0.36) 
-1.26 * 
(0.41) 
Log (Youth Population) 
3.48 * 
(0.74) 
3.64 * 
(0.73) 
3.87 * 
(0.76) 
3.67 * 
(0.75) 
Religious & Language Fractionalization 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Non Hindu Majority 
11.27 * 
(2.08) 
11.97 * 
(2.13) 
12.44 * 
(2.14) 
11.60 * 
(1.99) 
SC/ST Population Share 
-0.15 * 
(0.03) 
-0.14 * 
(0.03) 
-0.17 * 
(0.04) 
-0.15 * 
(0.04) 
Muslim Population Share 
0.22 ** 
(0.08) 
0.21 ** 
(0.08) 
0.20 ** 
(0.08) 
0.21 ** 
(0.08) 
Literacy Rates 
-0.17 * 
(0.04) 
-0.16 * 
(0.03) 
-0.18 * 
(0.03) 
-0.16 * 
(0.04) 
Social Sector Spending 
0.13 ** 
(0.06) 
0.14 ** 
(0.06) 
0.13 ** 
(0.06) 
0.13 ** 
(0.06) 
Congress Seat Share 
-5.76 * 
(1.78) 
-6.13 * 
(1.71) 
-5.50 * 
(1.64) 
-5.59 * 
(1.69) 
BJP Seat Share 
3.29 ** 
(1.33) 
3.42 ** 
(1.34) 
3.68 * 
(1.35) 
3.05 ** 
(1.35) 
BJP Presence at Center 
3.34 ** 
(1.28) 
3.33 ** 
(1.31) 
3.24 ** 
(1.30) 
3.41 * 
(1.28) 
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Poverty Difference 
0.02 
(0.03) ----- ----- 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Pay Inequality 
3.96 
(3.80) 
4.73 
(3.67) 
5.63 *** 
(3.66) ----- 
Time 
0.25 
(0.21) 
0.26 
(0.21) 
0.30 + 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.21) 
 
R-squared 0.834239 0.831179 0.834348 0.830196 
Adjusted R-squared 0.822125 0.819537 0.822924 0.818486 
S.E. of regression 5.106665 5.143688 5.095184 5.158642 
Log likelihood -843.4807 -846.0408 -843.3879 -846.8536 
F-statistic 68.86940 71.39001 73.03308 70.89279 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Number of States 28 28 28 28 
Number of Observations 280 280 280 280 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
If a state meets the condition of high income and high growth, its effect would be 
increase in employment opportunities thereby improving the socioeconomic conditions of 
the poor. This scenario yields dividends in the form of civil peace and higher respect for 
human rights. To capture this effect of high income and high growth we introduce 
interaction between economic growth and development (see model 5; table 2). Contrary 
to the conventional wisdom, we find positive effect of this interaction on human rights 
violation events. If a state meets the condition of high income and high growth, poverty 
and inequality should eventually fall because people would get employment 
opportunities. But, this seems to be quite opposite in the case of Indian states as the 
results show that the real benefits of higher economic growth is not translating into high 
economic development. In other words, the growth and development process in Indian 
states remains exclusive (Gupta, 1999). In models 6 and 7 (table 2) we capture the 
interactive effect of  economic growth, development with both urban and rural poverty 
rates to see whether impact of decline in poverty rates on human rights abuses events is 
conditional upon high income, high growth scenario. We find the results to be opposite, 
which means high income, high growth scenario is not helpful to make poverty rates 
(urban and rural) reduce human rights abuses. When the growth and development process 
remains exclusive, certain sections of the society, particularly, the poor and unorganized 
sector is excluded from the „growth story‟. We find the similar results in model 8 (table 
2) for interactive effect of economic growth, development and pay inequality. These 
results reiterate the failure of pay inequality to exploit high growth, high development 
process in helping to bring down human rights violation events.  
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5. Summary & Conclusion 
 
Earlier many attempts were made to study the various issues pertaining to human rights 
performance using cross sectional studies. However, studies of the same related to 
subnationals are absent. Therefore, we highlight the need to go below the national level to 
see how differently the regional dynamics and local factors may influence the human 
rights performance. In doing so, we choose India because of its vast diverse nature of 
economic, social, cultural and demographic factors within the regions, institutional 
design which is majoritarian yet ethnically very diverse and divisive regional political 
structure. While doing so, the study segregates various determinants into socioeconomic, 
institutional and political factors highlights regional and local dynamics necessary while 
conducting a subnational study. We take into account 28 states of India for the time 
period 1993 to 2002. Using pooled regression analysis we find that internal threat poised 
by number of social violence events, presence of civil war and riot hit disturbed areas are 
strongly associated with human rights abuses. Amongst socioeconomic factors, exclusive 
economic growth, uneven development, poor social development spending, youth bulges 
and differential growth rates between minority religious groups explain the likelihood of 
human rights violations. Capturing power at the state and central level by Hindu national 
parties like the BJP further help understand the incidence of human rights violations 
within India. We also could not find any positive impact of high income – high growth 
effect on reducing human rights violation events. Added to this, the conditional effect of 
high income – high growth on poverty rates (urban & rural) and inequality in fact 
increase human rights violation events. This goes to show that growth and development 
within India is not inclusive of all sections in the society.  
 
 
What Next? 
 
While we have focused on the most contentious topic in political economy, the 
determinants of human rights performance for subnational study using India as an 
example, our study suggests avenues for further research on this topic pertinent to India. 
It seems appropriate in the case of Indian states to gauge the impact of electoral 
competition on human rights performance. Investigation can be performed to explore 
whether government respect for human rights in states goes up during election years as 
compared to non-election years? Consistent with the idea that an incumbent government 
might exert greater effort in an election year to improve its respect for human rights, the 
timing of elections becomes important. In other words, whether the timing of elections 
affect government respect for human rights or not? If this theory holds on, then scheduled 
elections could be associated with increase in government respect for human rights. 
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Annexures 
 
 
Annexure 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Human Rights 
Violations 
GDP Growth 
rate 
Percapita 
GDP Population 
Population 
Growth rate 
Urban 
Poverty rate 
Rural 
Poverty rate 
Differential 
Poverty rates 
Youth 
Population 
 Mean  5.12  10.14  10950.64  33788.30  2.20  25.10  27.18  2.08  19452.90 
 Median  1.00  9.77  9403.50  21160.16  2.06  23.41  30.34 -2.29  13030.50 
 Maximum  98.00  38.16  31665.00  177869.7  6.02  67.81  57.94  37.28  99134.00 
 Minimum  0.00 -7.92  2728.00  295.75  0.46  1.98  0.10 -50.05  179.00 
 Std. Deviation  12.11  6.76  5630.03  39657.00  0.89  17.42  13.53  21.26  21837.59 
 Sum  1434.00  2840.17  3066180.  9460724.  616.80  7028.68  7611.58  582.89  5446812. 
 Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 Cross sections 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
 
 
 
Language 
Frac 
Non Hindu 
Majority 
Social 
sector 
spending 
Literacy 
rates 
Percent share 
of SC/ST 
population  
Percent share 
of Muslim 
population Civil War 
Social 
Violence 
events 
Disturbed 
areas 
Religious 
Frac 
 Mean  3.15  0.17  11.19  65.86  31.88  10.88  0.20  1.08  0.28  1.64 
 Median  1.49  0.00  8.20  65.17  22.80  7.45  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.42 
 Maximum  20.63  1.00  44.90  91.03  94.50  75.00  1.00  47.00  1.00  3.91 
 Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  40.30  1.80  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.08 
 Std. Deviation  4.72  0.38  7.68  11.61  23.51  14.37  0.40  3.70  0.45  0.56 
 Sum  884.61  50.00  3133.40  18440.93  8928.00  3049.00  56.00  304.00  79.00  459.92 
 Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 Cross sections 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
 
 
 
 
BJP Seat 
Share 
BJP Government 
Presence 
INC Seat 
share 
INC Government 
Presence Rule of Law 
GDP *Percapita 
GDP 
GDP *Percapita 
GDP * Urban 
Poverty 
GDP *Percapita 
GDP * Rural 
Poverty 
 Mean  0.13  0.17  0.30  0.38  9.42  109461.3  2688351.0  2580785.0 
 Median  0.03  0.00  0.27  0.00 -0.81  89795.18  2061063.0  2152311.0 
 Maximum  0.68  1.00  0.88  1.00  1459.26  634100.0  17139723  20302990 
 Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 -92.80 -114817.9 -4566308.0 -3729285.0 
 Std. Dev.  0.19  0.37  0.23  0.48  98.79  94816.54  2929412.  2605233.0 
 Sum  36.88  48.00  85.78  107.00  2636.89  30649167  7.53E+08  7.23E+08 
 Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 Cross sections 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
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Annexure – 2: Ranking of States in sample  
(Average number of Human rights violation events & average GDP growth rate) 
 
 
Sl. No. 
 
State(s) 
 
Average number of Human 
Rights violation events 
(1993 – 2000) 
Rank 
 
Average GDP 
growth rate 
(1993 – 2000) 
Rank 
 
1 Andaman & Nicobar Islands 0 26 2.98 28 
2 Andhra Pradesh 7.8 5 12.96 7 
3 Arunachal Pradesh 0.3 21 3.44 27 
4 Assam 13.4 2 10.01 17 
5 Bihar 6.5 7 10.63 15 
6 Chandigarh 0.3 21 8.66 20 
7 Delhi 5.8 8 8.44 21 
8 Goa 0.1 25 8.84 18 
9 Gujarat 1.4 15 11.36 14 
10 Haryana 0.4 19 13.83 3 
11 Himachal Pradesh 0.2 23 6.5 24 
12 Jammu & Kashmir 56.4 1 12.23 9 
13 Karnataka  1.7 13 13.24 5 
14 Kerala 0.3 21 14.28 2 
15 Madhya Pradesh 1.5 14 11.47 13 
16 Maharashtra 1.2 17 12.03 11 
17 Manipur 7.3 6 4.8 26 
18 Meghalaya 0.4 19 6.93 23 
19 Mizoram 1.2 17 13.52 4 
20 Nagaland 3.9 10 8.76 19 
21 Orissa 1.3 16 11.92 12 
22 Punjab 12.9 3 12.4 10 
23 Rajasthan 0.2 24 12.29 8 
24 Sikkim 0 26 6.01 25 
25 Tamil Nadu 2.8 11 13.17 6 
26 Tripura 9.7 4 7.96 22 
27 Uttar Pradesh 2.1 12 10.4 16 
28 West Bengal 4.2 9 14.97 1 
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Figure 1: Economic growth rates & human rights violation events 
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 Figure 2: Economic growth & growth rate of human rights violation events 
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Figure 3: Seat share of BJP & human rights violation events 
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Figure 4: Seat share of BJP & growth rate of human rights violation events 
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